Abstract. Most online feedback mechanisms publish unbiased statistics (usually averages) of past ratings. Such mechanisms fail in environments where the same seller sells products of many different qualities, such as marketplaces of used cars and collectibles. This paper presents a novel feedback management mechanism that succeeds in facilitating efficient transactions in such settings. One particularly interesting aspect of this mechanism is that it uses the threat of biased future reporting of quality in order to induce sellers to truthfully declare the quality of their items.
Introduction
In many marketplaces sellers have more information about the quality of the goods they sell than buyers do. Self-interested sellers are expected to try to take advantage of such information asymmetries by misrepresenting (inflating) the true quality of their goods and charging higher prices. Knowing this, however, rational buyers will ignore the sellers' quality signals and will only be willing to pay prices corresponding to the average expected quality of all goods in the marketplace. Left to itself, this set of behaviors will gradually drive high cost/high quality sellers out of the market and might even lead to the total dissolution of the marketplace [1] .
Since, in electronic markets, face-to-face interaction between the buyer and the seller and direct inspection of goods is usually not possible, the problem of quality uncertainty is exacerbated [7] . In such settings, the marketplace operator, acting as a trusted third party, can play a vital role in reducing uncertainty and facilitating efficient transactions. One obvious role would be to inspect and certify the quality of all goods offered for sale. However, such pre-sale inspection is not always practical and, even when it is practical, it would be prohibitively expensive and certainly not scalable to the size of some of today's electronic markets.
Another, more plausible, role for the marketplace is to operate a feedback or reputation mechanism [4] , [9] . Feedback mechanisms encourage buyers to rate the quality of goods received (as perceived by them). Submitted feedback is analyzed, aggregated with feedback received from other members and made publicly available to the community in the form of seller reputation profiles. Several examples of such mechanisms are already being used in a number of well-known online communities, such as eBay, Amazon, ePinions, Slashdot, etc. A growing body of empirical evidence seems to indicate that these systems have managed to provide remarkable stability in otherwise very risky trading environments [3] , [5] , [6] , [8] , [10] .
Almost all commercial feedback mechanisms in use today act as impartial rating aggregators: they accumulate individual ratings and publish an unbiased aggregate measure such as the sum or average of those ratings per product or per seller. In this paper I show that such mechanisms fail to induce cooperation in settings where the same seller may sell products of several different qualities, such as marketplaces of used cars, collectibles, etc. Furthermore, I propose a novel feedback management algorithm called "Goodwill Hunting" or GWH (for reasons that will become obvious in Section 3) that works in such settings. The most interesting feature of GWH is that it uses the threat of biased reporting of quality in order to induce sellers to truthfully reveal the qualities of their items.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains why simple feedback aggregation mechanisms fail in settings where the same seller may sell products of various qualities. Section 3 presents and analyzes the Goodwill Hunting mechanism under the assumption that buyers submit truthful feedback. Section 4 presents some extensions to the algorithm that provide incentives to buyers to submit truthful feedback. Section 5 discusses additional considerations that arise if we assume that players eventually exit the market. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Shortcomings of Simple Feedback Aggregation Mechanisms
The majority of today's feedback mechanisms operate as unbiased aggregators of consumer ratings: they solicit feedback regarding the buyers' perception of quality following transactions and publish a statistic (most often the average) of such feedback received so far for each seller. The purpose of this section is to show that such simple mechanisms fail in settings where sellers sell products of various qualities.
More specifically, the setting of this paper is a marketplace where a large number of long-lived sellers sell a wide variety of goods for which the demand is independent. Therefore, each seller can be considered a monopolist in his class of goods. The marketplace also contains a large number of long-lived buyers 1 
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According to the preceding reasoning, the revenue of a single auction round will be constant for a given seller and independent of the actual quality of the item being auctioned. Let ) ( 
. But then it will not be profitable for the seller to sell items of qualities s s> . This, in turn, will lower the seller's mean quality, which will lower the revenue of a single auction round, which will further lower the quality threshold of profitability, and so on, until the seller ends up selling only the lowest possible quality items in his inventory.
One might think that the situation can be improved by giving sellers the opportunity to declare the quality of each of their individual items. More specifically, suppose that the mechanism asks each seller to declare the quality To conclude, this section has shown that simple feedback aggregation mechanisms fail to facilitate efficient transactions in settings where each seller sells products of various different qualities. Even when such mechanisms ask sellers to truthfully declare the quality of their individual items, self-interested sellers will never find it optimal to do so.
The "Goodwill Hunting" Algorithm
The main argument of this paper is that feedback mechanisms can sometimes increase efficiency in the marketplace by taking a more active role than that of unbiased feedback aggregators. More specifically, I present a concrete mechanism that succeeds in facilitating efficient transactions in environments where sellers sell items of various qualities. The mechanism uses the threat of biased future reporting of quality in order to induce sellers to truthfully declare the individual qualities of their items.
The setting is identical to that of the previous section. Monopolist sellers sell infinite sequences of goods } { assume that the mechanism knows ) (⋅ G I assume that sellers have no control over the qualities and cost of individual goods in their sequences. This assumption is reasonable in settings where the act of accumulating inventory is independent from that of (re)selling it. For example, consider a user car dealership where one department is in charge of buying used cars (accumulating inventory) and another department is in charge of reselling them. I further assume that sellers cannot control the exact sequencing of goods they sell. This assumption simplifies the analysis because it eliminates the possibility of strategic sequencing: if sellers could decide on the sequencing of items, they could try to build a reputation by honestly selling low value items and then, once they have built a good reputation, "make a killing" by cheating on a few high value items. This assumption is more difficult to justify. It is reasonable in environments where, as above, accumulation and reselling of inventory are independent and concurrent activities and where inventory levels are kept low. In the used car dealership example, this would correspond to a situation where resellers sell cars at roughly the same pace as buyers accumulate them, so that at any given time, the number of cars on inventory is very low (in order for the assumption to strictly hold, this number must be equal to one) 4 .
With these two constraints in place, given a sequence of goods of qualities } { 
. Buyer perceives quality of item The goal of the mechanism is to facilitate efficient transactions by providing incentives to sellers to truthfully declare the qualities of their goods. To that end, the mechanism keeps track of a quantity that we will call the seller's goodwill. This quantity, at any given time is equal to the discounted sum of "unfair" monetary gains or losses that the seller has incurred during his entire stay in the marketplace relative to the reports (ratings) of the buyers that transacted with him. All sellers enter the market with zero goodwill. Following each transaction, if a buyer reports the product to have quality higher than what the seller declared, then the seller has incurred an "unfair" loss equal to ) ( ) (
by that amount. If, on the other hand the buyer reports lower quality, the seller has realized an "unfair" gain and the seller's goodwill is reduced accordingly. If a seller accumulates nonzero goodwill, then the mechanism adjusts the published quality p q of his subsequent goods relative to what the seller declares, so as to compensate/punish the seller for the amount of goodwill he has accumulated/owes. More specifically, if a seller has negative goodwill, (which occurs if the seller has overstated the quality of some of his goods in the past relative to the buyers perceptions), the mechanism reduces the published quality of all subsequent goods sold by the seller (relative to the declared quality) by a small amount, calculated to, over time, take away from the seller whatever unfair gains he previously realized by overstating the quality of his goods. Similarly, if the seller accumulates positive goodwill (which occurs if the seller has understated the quality of some of his goods in the past relative to the buyers perceptions), the mechanism increases the published quality of subsequent goods by a small amount, calculated to compensate the seller for whatever unfair losses he previously incurred. That way, as I will formally show below, the mechanism makes it impossible for the seller to realize any long-term gains by misrepresenting the quality of his products. Figure 1 summarizes the simplest version of the GWH mechanism. Figure 2 summarizes the notation used in this and the next section. The rest of the section explains why the mechanism indeed induces self-interested sellers to truthfully declare the qualities of their items. To simplify the analysis, this section makes the assumption that buyers always provide truthful (albeit noisy) feedback. Section 4 presents a few simple extensions of the GWH mechanism that provide incentives to buyers to indeed behave in this way.
Analysis of the GWH mechanism
In the setting described in this paper, given a sequence of items } { In the following analysis, we will use the notation 
Before we proceed, it will be useful to prove the following lemma: Proof: By the Optimality Principle of dynamic programming it suffices to show that there is no point at which a seller can make a one-time play different from the equilibrium play that raises his total payoff.
Making use of Lemma 1, (2) can be rewritten as: 
Substituting into (3) we get:
which shows that the seller's payoff does not directly depend on the declared qualities } { d i q and therefore cannot be increased by deviating from truth-telling.
Proposition 1 shows that the seller is indifferent between truthfully representing and misrepresenting the quality of his items. Under the assumption of risk-averse buyers, a small extension of the mechanism will strengthen the result even further and will make it strictly preferable for the seller to truthfully declare the qualities of his items.
In order to understand how the mechanism must be extended, it is important to understand the properties of the auction revenue function ) ( p q G . Proposition 2 shows that ) (⋅ G , and therefore the seller's revenues increase as the (buyers perception of the) variance of ε decreases. Therefore, it is to the seller's advantage to keep the buyers' perception of the variance as low as possible. The mechanism can induce the seller to always tell the truth by publishing an estimate of that variance, equal to the sample variance of the random variable:
where y is a random variable that takes the value +1 with probability 0.5 and -1 with probability 0.5. It is easy to see that 0
Suppose now that the seller attempts to misrepresent the quality of some of his items by declaring
, where ξ is a random variable. Given that 
We see that any attempt of the seller to deviate from truth telling increases ) (z Var , which is the system's estimate of ) (ε Var and therefore only serves to decrease the seller's revenues. If the mechanism publishes z , the seller will therefore find it optimal to always truthfully declare his perception of his products' qualities.
Incentives for Truthful Buyer Participation in the Feedback Mechanism
The previous section demonstrated that if buyers rate according to their truthful perception of quality, sellers find it optimal to truthfully declare the qualities of their items. This section presents some ideas on how the mechanism can be extended in order to induce buyers to indeed behave in this manner. The problem of inducing participation (let alone truthful participation) to feedback mechanisms has been identified by several authors, such as Avery, Resnick and Zeckhauser ( [2] ). The principal issue is that feedback information is a public good: its production incurs a (small) cost for the rater but, once produced, it can be freely consumed by everybody in the community. Therefore, community members have an incentive to free ride, consuming everybody else's feedback while submitting none of their own.
We begin by arguing that, if everybody rates truthfully, buyers are better off than if everybody rates randomly (or does not rate at all). If all buyers rate randomly then a seller's expected value function 
becomes independent of the seller's true item qualities and depends only on what the seller declares. Knowing this, rational buyers will ignore the signal p q published by the system and will always bid an amount equal to their expected utility averaged over all product qualities of all sellers in the marketplace.
Using arguments similar to those of Section 2, it can be shown that this situation will gradually drive sellers with higher average product qualities (and therefore higher average cost) out of the market and eventually will make everybody except sellers of lowest quality/cost leave the market. Buyers will therefore lose all surplus associated with purchasing from those vendors. Having established that truthful ratings benefit the community as a whole, I will now propose a simple mechanism that is designed to prevent individual buyer deviations from the community rating norms. I am making the assumption that, because the number of buyers and sellers in the marketplace is very large, each buyer transacts with a given seller at most once in her lifetime. Therefore, buyers gain nothing from strategically manipulating the feedback profile of a seller (with whom they will never transact) 7 . The objective of the mechanism is to simply make sure that (a) buyers take the "pain" of visiting the feedback submission screen and (b) buyers submit ratings, such that the mean and variance between the buyer's and the seller's perception of quality are consistent across the entire buyer community.
The principal idea is to levy a periodic membership fee b F from buyers and then offer buyers periodic rebates whose amount is contingent on the buyer's rating behavior.
The following are the rules of rebate calculation:
1. Buyers receive no rebate if they have failed to submit feedback regarding any transactions they have completed in the last period. This rule provides incentives for buyer participation in the feedback mechanism. 2. Buyers receive no rebate if the sample variance of the quantity p r− is equal to zero in the past period. This rule is designed to prevent buyers from simply reporting perceived qualities equal to published qualities (plus a constant). and penalizes buyers either for deviating from the community-wide quality perception error variance, or for submitting ratings that, on the average, are biased relative to the sellers' declaration of quality.
We do not claim that the above procedure is completely foolproof. For example, one way in which a buyer can earn high rebates without disclosing her true perception of quality is by submitting ratings equal to
, where η is a normally distributed random variable with mean zero and variance equal to the published variance for that seller. However, given that buyers do not benefit from strategically gaming the feedback mechanism, the author believes that developing a truly foolproof feedback elicitation mechanism is not a priority in the setting of this paper. What is needed is a mechanism that induces "lazy" buyers to spend the decidedly small effort required to navigate to an online marketplace's feedback submission screen and submit sensible (as opposed to completely random) feedback. The simple set of rules presented in this section satisfies those requirements.
Endgame Considerations
This section briefly discusses the implications of relaxing the assumption of infinitely lived buyers and sellers and proposes extensions to the mechanism that address the resulting considerations. Because of space limitations, the detailed proofs are omitted.
Sellers with Finite Horizons
In real-life, nobody lives forever. Through the use of the discount factor δ , the preceding analysis does incorporate the possibility that sellers may exit the market. However, it assumes that the decision to exit is based on a Bernoulli trial performed at the end of each cycle. In reality, sellers usually know when they will leave the market well in advance, while buyers ignore that information. Sellers, therefore, will try to take advantage of this information asymmetry by cheating buyers in the last few rounds of their stay on the market, accumulating negative goodwill that will never be repaid back to the community. One simple, and effective, way of addressing this problem is to extend the mechanism by charging sellers a fee 0 F upon entry in the marketplace. That fee serves as a bond: when a seller exits the marketplace, he is paid back that fee (plus interest) minus the current amount of goodwill owed to the marketplace.
More specifically, the required extensions to the mechanism have as follows:
1. Upon entry to the marketplace, a new seller pays an amount 0 F to the center.
The seller can elect to pay any amount 0 F greater than the maximum revenue 0 G of a single transaction. 
, the seller is expelled from the marketplace (but may re-enter, by paying a new fee). 3. If a seller voluntarily exits the marketplace at the end of the i th transaction, he is repayed back an amount equal to
Buyers with Finite Horizons
Buyers can also exit the market at any time. However, the issues related to buyer "misbehavior" (in the sense of reduced participation in the feedback mechanism or untruthful ratings) right before exit are less severe because the mechanism already charges buyers a periodic fee, part of which is refunded at the end of the period on the basis of buyer rating "performance". That fee thus acts as a bond that gives buyers incentives to conform to rating norms up until the end of their stay on the market.
Concluding Remarks
Online reputation mechanisms are emerging as a promising alternative to more traditional trust building mechanisms in electronic markets. The appeal of reputation mechanisms is that, when they work, they facilitate cooperation without the need for additional costly enforcement institutions. They have, therefore, the potential of providing more economically efficient solutions in a wide range of adverse selection and moral hazard settings. This paper has studied one such setting, namely marketplaces where sellers sell heterogeneous goods of variable quality. In such settings, simple feedback aggregation mechanisms fail to facilitate efficient transactions between buyers and sellers. This paper presented "Goodwill Hunting" (GWH), a novel feedback management mechanism that succeeds in facilitating efficient transactions in such settings. The GWH mechanism takes a more active stance than most current feedback mechanisms, in that it adjusts the information declared by sellers about the qualities of their products before publishing it to the buyers in ways that provide sellers with incentives to truthfully declare these qualities.
The initial results reported in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. First, this paper assumes that sellers are monopolists. This is not a realistic assumption, especially in large-scale electronic marketplaces, such as eBay. It is important to study the behavior of the GWH mechanism in the presence of multiple competing sellers. Second, I have assumed that sellers do not control the costs and sequencing of the items they sell. Although this assumption can be justified in a number of settings (see discussion in Section 3), it would be interesting to consider the implications of removing it. Third, I have made the simplifying assumption that each buyer buys from a given seller only once. This removes the need to consider strategic misreporting of quality by buyers, but is clearly not very realistic, especially under the assumption of monopolist sellers. It is therefore important to more carefully study to what extent feedback mechanisms are sensitive to strategic feedback manipulation from the part of buyers. 
